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1988] HOLOCAUST CONFERENCE 
UNITED STATES RESPONSES 
Ms. Ruti C. Teitel:' We are continuing with the issue of responses to World War II war 
criminals and human rights violators. We heard in the earlier panel about the difficulty 
of achieving convictions in the German trials and a variety of proof and jurisdictional 
problems. And while we now switch to the American response to Nazi war criminals and 
to the deportation area, which is not per se criminal, but still has a very difficult criminal 
standard, we'll see that we will encounter some of the same issues. 
We are very lucky here to have a panel of people who have all been involved in the 
actual work of the United States Justice Department denazification efforts which have 
been going on since the 70's. On my right is Allan Ryan Jr.,2 now at Harvard University 
and former director of the Office of Special Investigations of the United States Depart-
ment of Justice. On my left is Eli Rosenbaum3 who is working with the Justice Depart-
ment, and is General Counsel at the World Jewish Congress. On his left is Bruce Einhorn4 
who is the Senior Trial Attorney at the Office of Special Investigations. 
Martin Mendelsohn was also to be on this panel. He is in Yugoslavia instead at the 
Artukovic trial. The trial of Andrija Artukovic is one that anybody involved in the U.S. 
efforts has been awaiting for over thirty years. I am going to turn to Mr. Ryan for his 
comments, then we will have fifteen minutes of prepared remarks and a discussion. 
Mr. Allan Ryan Jr.: As Ruti mentioned, I was the Director of the Office of Special 
Investigations in the Justice Department from 1980, shortly after its formation, until 
1983. At this table in front of you, I think, perhaps, might be the first meeting of the 
Office of Special Investigations. Eli was in the Office, Bruce is still in the Office as a 
Senior Trial Attorney, and I think it is fair to say that between the three of us we know 
everything there is to know, so you've come to the right place. 
The story of Nazi war criminals in America is a story quite different from what you 
heard a few moments ago from Fritz Weinschenk and Henry Friedlander. If one were 
to ask me to summarize the United States' response to Nazi war criminals from 1945 
through 1980, the answer would be very simple and short, because the answer would 
be nothing. Zero. Nothing was done in this country regarding Nazi war criminals for 
that period of time. To understand why that is so and why it has changed in the last six 
years, it is necessary, I think, to go back a little bit in history and to look at the question 
of how Nazi war criminals came to this country. What you will find is contrary to many 
popular impressions. 
I Ms. Teitel is Assistant Director of the Anti-Defamation League's National Law Department. 
She has extensive experience in domestic and international human and civil rights. She has pub-
lished widely in her specialty, church-state issues. Ms. Teitel is one of the original members of the 
Holocaust/Human Rights Research Project's Advisory Board. 
2 Mr. Ryan is the former Director of the Office of Special Investigations, United States De-
partment of Justice (1980-1983). He is currently General Counsel at Harvard University. A former 
law clerk to Justice Byron White (1970-1971), Mr. Ryan has served in the Marines, and worked in 
private practice. He is the author of QUIET NEIGHBORS: PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN 
AMERICA (1984). 
3 Mr. Rosenbaum is General Counsel to the World Jewish Congress. He formerly worked at 
the Office of Special Investigations, Department of Justice, and in private practice in New York. 
• Mr. Einhorn is a Senior Trial Attorney at the Office of Special Investigations, Department of 
Justice. He served as OSI's counsel in the Demjanjuk case. Mr. Einhorn is a founding national editor 
of the CIVIL LIBERTIES REVIEW. 
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Nazi war criminals in this country, by and large, are neither German nor Austrian, 
but rather Eastern European, specifically Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, Estonian, and 
various other Eastern European nationalities. The reason for that has to do very much 
with immigration patterns and with the laws of this country after World War II. As you 
know, the Germans occupied Eastern Europe, virtually all the way to the gates of Moscow, 
for a good part of the war and it was in that area that they carried out much of the 
Holocaust. In 1944, as the Red Army started to push the Germans westward, the 
collaborators, those who had taken part in the machinery and the administration of 
genocide, retreated with them. In the spring of 1945, with the end of the war, these 
people were in Germany and Austria like so much driftwood thrown up on the beach 
after a storm. They became, almost overnight, displaced persons. 
Displaced persons or refugees, as we would probably call them in today's parlance, 
were considered to be those who had been uprooted from their homes by the turmoil 
of war. There were one million displaced persons in Europe at the end of the summer 
of 1945. Surely there were innocent people who had done no wrong, but, also among 
that one million there was a very large number of people who were not innocent. People 
were there because they had been fleeing the Red Army, fleeing justice coming at them 
from the east. They were the handmaidens of Nazism, the guards at the death camps, 
and others, who found themselves in Germany and in Austria at the end of 1945. 
The policy in this country during the years from 1945 through 1948 was at first 
one of indecision, and then one of gradually mounting pressure from a number of 
segments in this country to let in the refugees of Europe who, after all, were fleeing 
communism. Particularly after 1947, with the announcement of the Truman Doctrine 
when communism and the Soviet Union became our officially certified enemies, there 
was great pressure in this country to allow those displaced people to come here and to 
begin again, to flee the godlessness of communism and to come to a free country. All of 
the appeals to our patriotic nature were in full force during those years. 
But, what happened in Congress was something quite different. Instead of passing 
a law that said the first 400,000 people could come, or that innocent refugees could 
come, or that the victims of the Holocaust could come, Congress said that 400,000 people 
eventually could come to this country; however four out of every ten visas, by law, had 
to go to Baltic nationals - BaIts being Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians. The reason 
for that preference ostensibly was that the Soviet Union had occupied those countries 
and we did not recognize that occupation. Indeed, to this day we do not recognize that 
occupation officially. 
The logic seems to have been that all of the Baits, the Latvians, the Lithuanians, 
and the Estonians in these camps were, by virtue of that fact alone, fleeing Soviet 
occupation and therefore, must have been desirable immigrants to the United States. In 
fact, that was a grossly wrong and oversimplified generalization because the level of 
collaboration with the Nazis in those countries was as high as in any country in Europe. 
Jews in Latvia and Lithuania, and to a somewhat lesser extent, in Estonia were killed 
not so much by Germans but by Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians. These are the 
very people who went to the head of the line in getting visas to come to the United 
States. 
A second preference that was built into that law was for what were termed agricul-
turalists, farmers, and foresters. That was a provision that had great benefit for the 
Ukrainians, who are from an agricultural nation. The level of collaboration with the 
Nazis in the Ukraine was as high as in any other country in Europe. There was a very 
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large Jewish population in the Ukraine that was killed through acts of collaboration by 
Ukrainian nationals. They went to the head of the line along with the Baits because of 
the farmers' preference. 
The third preference that was built into the law, the most unbelievable of all, was 
that fifty thousand visas were by law to be given to those known as the Volksdeutsch. 
Volksdeutsch were German ethnic populations outside Germany. They were, in case after 
case, the fifth column in many of these countries that were occupied by Nazi Germany. 
They were such notorious collaborators that even the International Refugee Organiza-
tion, which was part of the U.N., would have nothing to do with them. They could not 
qualify as displaced persons (DP) under the International Refugee Organization, and 
yet in the Displaced Persons Act, 50,000 of them were given visas to come to this country. 
The fourth provision in that law said, not quite in so many words, but certainly in 
effect, that Jews need not apply. It provided that anyone who was not in the DP camps 
as of December 22, 1945, and who had not been there continuously since then could 
not come. It was a legal way to write a provision that Jews could not come to this country 
under the DP Act. At least 90% of them could not come because they could not meet 
that eligibility requirement. The requirement was debated on the floor of the Congress 
and the members were for or against it based on whether they thought Jews should or 
should not come to this country. One senator said, "This would be a very good bill if 
only we could figure out some way to keep out the Jews." And that was done. 
So what you have from 1948 to 1952 in this country when this Act was in effect, is 
a very large number of those who had taken part in the Holocaust coming to the United 
States because of the various preferences that were built into the DP Act. The DP Act 
did have a sentence that said Nazi war criminals were ineligible, but this provision was 
mainly for show, because it could not be enforced. Indeed, it was almost contrary to the 
whole spirit of the DP Act because by giving 40% of all visas to Baits it was virtually 
inevitable that a large number would go to those who had collaborated with the Nazis. 
So the question of how Nazi war criminals came to this country by and large is not 
a story of intelligence collaboration. It is much more shocking, I think, because it is a 
story that was debated on the front pages of our newspapers. In the Congress it was a 
very public debate that lead to the passage of this law. We invited Nazi war criminals to 
come into this country because we passed a law that made it easy for them to do so 
throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. 
What happened to these people? Nothing. There were one or two cases, the Artu-
kovic case being the most significant, where the immigration service almost literally 
stumbled over Nazi war criminals and did bring prosecutions that were, withoutexcep-
tion, ineffectual. There was no public support. There was no sentiment in Congress. 
There was no sentiment in any segment of this community. There was no comment in 
the press, to speak of, saying, "We have Nazi war criminals in this country and we 
shouldn't. Be rid of them." That simply did not happen. 
These people came, to this country and they settled in cities like New York, Phila-
delphia, Chicago, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and Boston. They became quiet neigh-
bors, which happens to be the title of a book that I wrote about the subject because that 
to me epitomizes Nazi war criminals in this country. They did not join neo-Nazi orga-
nizations. They did not take anti-semitic stands on the Boston Common. They did not 
become politically active. They wanted to lay low and have absolutely no reason for 
anyone to look at their past, and that is exactly what they did. For thirty years nobody 
did look at them. 
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That changed starting in the late 1970s through the efforts of two people - Joshua 
Eilberg, who had been a Congressman from Philadelphia, and Liz Holtzman, then a 
Congresswoman from Brooklyn who succeeded Eilberg as Chairman of the Immigration 
Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee. Through their efforts, certainly those 
of Liz Holtzman, two things happened in this country. To begin with, for the first time 
in our history, a record of Nazi war crimes became a deportable offense. Prior to 1979, 
no one could be deported from this country for having committed Nazi war crimes 
because there was no provision that allowed that. Secondly, the Department of Justice 
had appropriated, at that time, 2.3 million dollars to investigate and prosecute Nazi war 
criminals in this country. That was the beginning of the Office of Special Investigations 
which was created in 1979. 
This was the first time that this government took any organized or comprehensive 
look at Nazi war criminals in the United States. Since that time, fifty cases, more or less, 
have been filed against Nazi war criminals in this country. How does that happen? It 
proceeds from a very simple legal theory which was upheld by the Supreme Court in 
the Fedorenko case in 1981, that under the Displaced Persons Act it was illegal to come 
here if you were a Nazi war criminal. Forget how easy it was as a practical matter. It was 
still illegal. Anyone who came here with a background, a record of Nazi persecution, 
was an illegal immigrant. They succeeded in coming here by fraud because they had 
concealed their backgrounds. They had said they were farmers. They said they were 
prisoners of war. They said they were anything except death camp guards and they got 
visas and they came here, so they were illegal immigrants. 
If they were illegal immigrants then their citizenship is invalid, since one of the 
requirements for citizenship is a legal entry into this country and five years lawful 
residence. If their citizenship is invalid, it can be revoked by court order upon clear and 
convincing evidence that it is invalid. How do we prove it is invalid? We prove it is invalid 
by proving that they were Nazi criminals- that is, that they took part in the persecution 
of innocent people under the Nazi regimes of Europe from 1939 to 1945. That is the 
definition in the law. They advocated, assisted, and took part in the persecution of those 
people based on race, religion or political beliefs. 
So if you were to walk into a courtroom in one of these trials, you would think that 
it is a war crimes trial. There are documents. There are witnesses. The entire focus of 
the trial is, "What did this man do in those years from 1933 to 1945?" We have to prove 
through the evidence that he took part in the persecution of innocent people, that he 
committed Nazi war crimes. If that can be shown - and almost without exception, in 
all of our trials to date it has been - then it is a' relatively easy matter from a legal 
perspective to say, "His entry into this country was illegal, therefore, his citizenship is 
invalid and should be revoked." Once his citizenship is revoked and he is no longer a 
citizen of this country, he is subject to deportation. That, unfortunately, requires a second 
and separate proceeding to bring about his deportation. 
We are talking about seven separate levels of hearing and appeals, by the way, in 
these two procedures combined. ·Even when that is proven, we face the third, and in 
many ways, the most difficult hurdle which is, who is going to take this person in. All of 
the deportation orders in this country do not amount to anything if there is no other 
country that is willing to accept this deportee. We cannot put them on a ferry and take 
them three miles out of Boston Harbor and cut the line. Unfortunately, we cannot, and 
we cannot put them on a plane to nowhere. We have to have the agreement of some 
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other country to take them in and for many years, and still to some extent today, that 
agreement was very difficult to achieve. 
The Germans do not want any of these people back. The Germans will not take any 
of these people back, unless they still happen to be German citizens today which has 
happened to my knowledge in only one case so far. Israel, with one exception that I will 
mention briefly, has not yet declared its willingness to take these people in. The Soviet 
Union is perhaps the only exception to the rule. They are willing and ready to take back 
those whom they consider to be Soviet citizens, that is, born in the Soviet Union. 
I'll just cite you the case of Bishop Trifa, a Romanian who was ordered deported 
from this country for advocating genocide and taking part in genocide in Romania, who 
simply would not be accepted by any other country. So, people like this stay here. We 
figured out a few ways to get around that in some cases, but the point to be made is that 
the deportation order by itself means the end of the legal process. It does not necessarily 
guarantee that the person leaves this country. 
What happens when a person gets to another country under a deportation order? 
It depends entirely on what that other country chooses to do. In the case of Germany, 
they have shown no interest in putting these people on trial. Regarding the Soviet Union, 
the jury is still out, so to speak. There have been two exceptions which I will just mention 
briefly. 
One, is the Artukovic case, the trial that is going on now in Yugoslavia. Artukovic 
was the Minister of the Interior for the Independent State of Croatia which was nothing 
more than a Nazi puppet government, set up in that part of Yugoslavia known as Croatia, 
with the main purpose of killing all the Serbs and all the Jews in Croatia. Some thirty 
thousand Jews, which comprised a great majority of Jews in that particular country, and 
over four hundred thousand, perhaps as many as seven hundred thousand Serbs were 
killed under the secret police that reported to this man. He came to the United States 
in 1948 under a false name and only six weeks ago he was extradited to Yugoslavia 
where he is now facing trial on those charges. [Artukovic was convicted. He died in 
prison in January, 1988.] 
The second case that you should be aware of is that of John Demjanjuk, the man 
who operated the gas chamber at Treblinka. We went to trial against him in 1981 in 
Cleveland. His citizenship was revoked. He was later ordered deported. While that was 
on appeal, Israel requested his extradition, which was granted by our courts. He is now 
in a prison cell in Israel. He will go on trial later this year. The testimony at that trial in 
Cleveland was remarkable. This is a man who still today, at age 65, is big, strong, and 
strapping. The testimony was that he had operated the gas chamber at Treblinka into 
which hundreds of people were crammed every day as they got off the trains coming 
from Warsaw. Demjanjuk was the man who turned on the engine from a captured 
Russian tank and pumped carbon monoxide into the room through a rubber hose until 
all the people were dead, day after day, day after day. The number of people killed at 
Treblinka, by the most reliable estimate that I have found, is 1.2 million. 
The number who survived Treblinka was exactly thirty eight. Five of those people 
came to Cleveland and were able to identify Demjanjuk by using photo spreads that 
included photos of Demjanjuk from that period of time, 1941. He is now in Israel. It 
will be the first war crimes trial in Israel since Adolf Eichmann's twenty five years ago. 
The experience of putting Demjanjuk on trial is going to be a fascinating one. I am 
going to be in Israel next month to work with the State's Attorney over there on this 
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case, and I think the evidence will show there as it did here, that this man is a major 
Nazi war criminal. Not because he is a household name, not because he had a high 
government post like Artukovic or Eichmann, but because he was the man who by his 
own hand put to death hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children. He lived 
in this country. He worked on the assembly line of a Ford motor company in Cleveland, 
a typical quiet neighbor who raised his family, did not cause anybody any problems, and 
yet who symbolizes what has happened in this country in the last forty years - he spent 
thirty years of peace and quiet with nobody looking at him and then the last five years 
facing trial, and now he faces justice in Israel. 
I will conclude only with this thought. The record ofthe United States in prosecuting 
Nazi war criminals has been, at best, a very mixed one. If we were sitting here in 1979, 
we would say the record is abysmal, in fact, virtually non-existent. I do not want to 
pretend to you that in the last six years we have completely redeemed that record. No 
effort that begins in 1979 to prosecute Nazi war criminals who committed crimes from 
1933 to 1945 can be anything more than a very, very belated effort. But I think it does 
show something very important in this country, which is that we have resolved that Nazi 
war criminals shall not die here in peace. They may have come here in peace, but they 
will not die here in peace. 
The reason is not necessarily because we will find them all and bring them all to 
trial. We surely will not. However, there is not one Nazi criminal in this country today 
who can go to sleep peacefully tonight and say, "I have nothing to worry about." These 
Nazi criminals look around at what they have seen for the last six years and they see 
that the government of this country and the people of this country are serious at long 
last about bringing these people to justice. It is a late effort. There is no question about 
it. But it is a determined effort through the work and the dedication of people like Eli 
and Bruce and the others at OSI. 
It is a signal, if you will, to all people who came here in those years, that their days 
of peace and security are over. Many of them will die in this country, but no one I think 
in this country today can look at Artukovic, who is in Yugoslavia, or look at Demjanjuk, 
who is in Israel, or look at Arthur Rudolph, who is in Germany, and say, "I have nothing 
to worry about." So if there is a contribution to be made here, I think that it is what this 
government has done in the last five or six years. It leaves us, as I say, with a mixed 
record, but I would prefer a record that began belatedly rather than one that did not 
begin at all. 
So when the history of this effort is written, the verdict, I think, will not be entirely 
against us. Thank you. 
Ms. Teitel: Thank you, Allan, for that excellent overview. Now we will turn to Bruce 
Einhorn who actually worked on the Demjanjuk case that Allan Ryan talked about. We 
will also hear about some new developments. 
Mr. Bruce Einhorn: Good morning. I am very privileged to have been asked to participate 
at this symposium. I am particularly privileged to share the podium with two very good 
friends and former colleagues, Allan and Eli, whose hardworking spirits continue to 
show their positive effects at the Office of Special Investigations. 
Allan has given you a brief history of OSI and I am not going to repeat it except 
to say that prior to the creation of OSI by the Attorney General Order 851-79 in 
September of 1979, around the time I started there, the effort to denaturalize and 
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deport alleged Nazi war criminals and participants was something of an extracurricular 
activity of the federal government. In large part, this is because that kind of an under-
taking with its historical overtones and differentiation from standard immigration law 
work required a certain kind of staff, a certain kind of budget, and a certain kind of 
dedication. And that in turn is what led to the creation of the OSI. 
The OSI is what it has always been. There are attorneys and prosecutors to be sure. 
There are historians and multilingual experts on World War II and on the history of 
twentieth century Germany and Eastern Europe. There are paralegals, criminal inves-
tigators, and a support staff of secretaries and clerks. Together, those of us who are 
there from our various callings make up the OSI. Business at the Office remains quite 
brisk. We have begun over a thousand investigations in all. There have been about one 
thousand investigative cases that have come through the Office of Special Investigations. 
About four hundred of those investigations are still active. Approximately fifty-eight 
cases have been filed in either Federal District Court or Federal Immigration Court. 
Almost all the cases that have been litigated by OSI have been won by OSI. Approxi-
mately ten people have been permanently expelled from the United States by means of 
either deportation, extradition or voluntary departure as a result of the denaturalization 
or deportation cases. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 is the procedural centerpiece for 
what OSI does. I refer you to certain provisions of the Immigration Act that are used 
every day by OSI. One is section 1451A, which is the provision that describes the 
procedures for denaturalizing naturalized citizens of the United States. Those proceed-
ings are equitable in nature and the trials are conducted by judges and not by juries. 
Then there is the deportation provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
section 1251A, with procedures and sections that follow describing the way in which a 
lawful permanent resident of the United States, if he can be shown to have been an 
illegal alien, can be deported - expelled forever from the United States. They are not 
covered by the Administrative Procedure Act. They are covered by the Immigration 
Act. They are, however, administrative in nature. They are presided over by finders of 
fact called Immigration Judges, who are employees of the Department of Justice, and 
whose decisions are subject to appeal. 
The work of OSI also involves other pieces of legislation. These are provisions and 
laws that were in operation at the time OSI subjects came to the United States. Under 
the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, if an individual entered the 
United States in violation of the law under which he was issued entrance or if he lied 
about material facts of his background in order to procure a visa under that law, then 
he is subject to denaturalization and/or deportation. In other words, one is procedurally 
sued under the Immigration Act for having entered the United States in violation of a 
previous act. Such previous acts are the Displaced Persons Act, the Refugee Relief Act 
of 1953, the Presidential Proclamation of July 1941, and the subsequently issued regu-
lations in the CFR, Title 8 and Title 22 in 1945 which barred the admission of any 
person who acquiesced in conduct contrary to civilization and human decency on behalf 
of the Axis powers. Also we have the Holtzman Amendment, named after one of its 
sponsors, Congressman Holtzman of New York, in Title 8, USC section 1251(A)(19) and 
Title 8, USC section 1182(A)(33). To make a long story short, that provision simply 
states that if you were a participant in conduct which amounts to persecution against 
people because of their race, religion, national origin, or political opinion, you are 
deportable if you are here, and excludable if you are trying to come here. 
24 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:3 
The litigation process at OSI that operates under these laws is a multi-layered 
process. First, we have to begin with the denaturalization process if the individual is a 
citizen. Under federal law, a citizen of the United States may never be barred from 
entering the United States. Therefore, we must change the citizen back into an alien to 
kick him out. We do that by having a denaturalization trial after having discovery under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It could take quite a long time. Following the 
bench trial, the equity trial, the OSI wins a denaturalization judgment. That judgment 
is appealed to the appropriate Circuit Court of Appeals. If OSI prevails with an affirm-
ance, the alien may appeal his denaturalization decision by petitioning for a writ of 
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. Certiorari is denied. Or if, as in 
the case of Fedorenko, certiorari is granted but an affirmance is issued, then and only 
then, is the alien deprived of his citizenship once and for all. Then deportation pro-
ceedings may proceed. 
Deportation proceedings are begun by the filing of what is called an Order to Show 
Cause. It is the functional, not the moral, equivalent of a complaint and is filed by service 
on the alien and on the Immigration Court in the city in which the alien resides. The 
alien is not entitled to an extensive discovery but to a de novo hearing of evidence and 
law in which the government bears the same burden of proof it bore in the denaturali-
zation trial. That burden consists of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the 
person who is the subject of the allegations in the chosen document is subject either to 
denaturalization or to deportation. 
The clear and convincing evidence standard for denaturalization and deportation 
cases was established by the United States Supreme Court in the Schniederman case for 
denaturalization actions, and in the Woodbee case for deportation actions. It is the highest 
standard of proof in civil litigation that exists in the United States. If the deportation 
hearing results in an order of deportation, then the alien again may appeal the decision 
to an administrative court in Washington, from there to another Circuit Court where he 
resides, and finally he may again petition for a writ of certiorari. If he is denied certiorari 
review one more time then he is deportable from the United States, and then we must 
find a country to take him. By law the alien may choose the country. However, if that 
country rejects him or, as in the Demjanjuk case, the alien refused to answer and I named 
the Soviet Union, the government would be in the position of naming the country of 
deportation. 
That is how OSI works. That indicates to you some of the frustration as well as 
some of the challenges of being a litigator for OS!. I do not want to take up too much 
more time. Let me give you a little idea of what our recent developments have been like. 
First, let me tell you that one of the most interesting legal developments that has 
occurred in OSI has been the development and the application of collateral estoppel. It 
may not seem interesting but it is important to our work. Finally, courts have begun to 
apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to hold that if a denaturalization judgment 
resulted in a certain series of legal findings which deal with an alien's unlawful entry 
into the United States, then in the deportation proceeding those issues, if they are 
necessary to the outcome, are deemed conclusively established and may not be challenged 
by a de novo decision by the immigration judge. 
In the Demjanjuk case, the Sixth Circuit applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
to uphold the administrative board's order of deportation against Demjanjuk on the 
theory that the board had had no choice. The District Court in Cleveland had issued 
findings of fact stating that Demjanjuk, because of his heinous activity in Treblinka, had 
entered the United States unlawfully under the Displaced Persons Act. 
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The doctrine of collateral estoppel might well be a valuable assisting agent in the 
effort to enforce and quicken some of the deportation judgments OSI will get. 
Another recent development has been the Artukovic case. Allan has filled you in on 
that case. Andrija Artukovic came to the United States in 1948. The deportation pro-
ceedings which were resumed against him in the 1970s and early 1980s were deferred 
when his extradition was requested by Yugoslavia, which was recently successfully 
achieved. However, extradition had previously been requested by Yugoslavia in the 
1950s. The federal courts in California originally had determined that the crimes with 
which he was charged were not crimes of a nature that could subject him to extradition. 
They were political in nature under a doctrine and extradition law known as Political 
Offenses. He was exempt from extradition. However, the recent decision of the Ninth 
Circuit in the District Court of California has changed all that. I have a sore spot for 
the Demjanjuk case because I've been on it for six years. Allan has given you a summary 
of the allegations. Demjanjuk is the subject of a denaturalization case which began nine 
years ago. When OSI was established we became the managing agency in the prosecution 
of De~anjuk in the form of the denaturalization trial in which OSI was successful. We 
then moved to a deportation form, where, as I told you, we used the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel, and also alternative findings. We were successful again. Israel requested juris-
diction and, for the first time in history, a nation state voluntarily surrendered a person 
accused of not only persecuting, but exterminating Jews to Israel for trial in Israel under 
the laws of Israel. The Demjanjuk case is obviously significant for other reasons. There 
is nothing to compare it to. It is one of a kind and it is significant in a few brief other 
ways. 
The Demjanjuk extradition decision basically boiled down to the following holdings. 
The District Court, which was later affirmed, held that, absent congressional intent to 
the contrary, the law of nations is part of the law of the United States. International law 
does not prohibit the application of a nation's laws or of a nation's jurisdiction over non-
citizens who commit crimes extraterritorily from the nation which seeks to prosecute the 
alleged offenders. Certain offenses may be punishable under international law by any 
state in the world because certain kinds of offenders, those who participate in the mass 
extermination of civilians for reasons of race and religion, are "enemies of the human 
race," common enemies of all humankind. Not only is it the right, but also the duty of 
the world through its states, its nation states, to seek a means of prosecuting such 
individuals. 
That doctrine, by the way, was enunciated not by Israel first, but by the United 
States military. In the Nuremberg trials, the U.S. military issued a report which clearly 
stated that the universality principle of jurisdiction and the extraterritoriality principle 
of jurisdiction were the preeminent principles in the prosecution of alleged Nazi war 
criminals. 
Indeed in a famous case, United States v. Valdick, a United States Military Court 
convicted people for concentration camp atrocities which were committed in a zone of 
occupation, not American after the war, against nationals who were not American. The 
case by the United States was based on the theory that the United States had the right 
and duty to see to it that such people were brought to justice, that crimes, such as mass 
murder committed at concentration camps, have always been crimes, and that there is 
no ex post facto in the law of murder. 
This is a very important part of the Demjanjuk case which recites and upholds 
previous decisions of the United States and International Military Tribunals in post-war 
Europe. The Demjanjuk case is also interesting in that it favorably compares to a previous 
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decision having nothing to do with OSI, but having a great deal to do with human rights 
and international law. This previous case is that of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, in which an 
individual was found on the streets, I believe in Brooklyn, who had allegedly participated 
in state torture of civilians in Paraguay. Survivors of the victims sued in federal court in 
New York under the Federal Alien Tort Statute to bring this man, who was found in 
New York, to some sort of civil justice. 
The Second Circuit held that since the law of nations forms a part of the laws of 
the United States, and since state torture has always been considered to be criminal 
under the law of nations, then if there was a jurisdictional predicate for the United 
States to take cognizance of what American law already regarded as a substantive offense, 
this individual could be subject to legal action. 
Both Filartiga and Demjanjuk represent a high water mark in the effort to bring 
international outlaws, who employ state torture and state extermination techniques 
against innocent civilians, to justice. In Filartiga a federal statute brought an individual 
to justice here, and in Demjanjuk a treaty brought a Nazi criminal to justice in another 
democratic state. The Demjanjuk case, while it is in some ways unprecedented, stands for 
fundamental principles of international and American law that I would hope will not be 
forgotten in the future. However, what the case holds for the future is the subject of 
unanswered questions. 
Ms. Teitel: Thank you, Bruce. We will go straight to Eli, who will bring up some of the 
proof problems raised by the reliance on evidence from the Soviet Union and other 
Eastern European countries. 
Mr. Eli Rosenbaum: Thanks, Ruti. I will try to be brief because I know we are running a 
little late. Permit me a brief diversion at the beginning to say that I am delighted to be 
up here, in particular with people I know and admire and have a great deal of affection 
for. Starting with Allan Ryan: under his leadership, OSI had the highest rate of success 
in litigation of any section in the entire Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, 
despite the terrible problems we had in proving these crimes after forty years, crimes 
that were committed in a way that was intended to annihilate all potentially sympathetic 
witnesses. Those facts put the record of OSI under Allan's stewardship in a very special 
light. It really is an extraordinary record. Bruce Einhorn, my colleague for many years 
at OSI, where he has handled many major cases, did himself a disservice by saying that 
he was "associated" with the Demjanjuk case. He has been directing the prosecution of 
that case now for many years and he is the one primarily responsible for getting 
Demjanjuk extradited to Israel and also for some remarkable successes in many other 
cases. I have learned a lot from Bruce, and I continue to learn a lot from him. I do 
hope, by the way, that you meant to say that I was a former colleague, not a former 
friend. 
Ruti Teitel is the only person up here who really has not been introduced. So, sorry 
Ruti, I am going to do it. She is Assistant Director of the National Law Department of 
the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith, someone who has done extraordinary work 
in many different areas, particularly in the church-state separation area, and who is in 
substantial measure responsible for the success of the Boston College Holocaust Human 
Rights Project. She was probably the first person in the organized Jewish community to 
appreciate the need for this and to arrange for funding for it. Would that we had had 
something like this group when I was a law student, not too far from here, back in 1978-
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79 when the West German Statute of Limitations was about to run - something we 
tried valiantly to stop. In the end, I think it was the NBC film Holocaust that actually 
prevented it. We had no resource like this to turn to when we desperately needed it. 
Ruti has played a major role in that, and of course, a major role in the work of what, 
along with the NAACP, must be considered one of the top two civil rights organizations 
in this country during the twentieth century. 
I have been asked to discuss the subject of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the Nazi cases. 
The first question is why do we need it? The explanation is simple. As Allan alluded to 
earlier, many, if not most, of the Nazi suspects who are under investigation in the United 
States committed their crimes in areas that are now behind the Iron Curtain. All of the 
Nazi death camps, for instance, not to be confused with the concentration camps, were 
located on territory that is now behind the Iron Curtain. When the Germans and their 
allies retreated from those areas, they left behind a wealth of documentary evidence. 
These were the documents that they were not able to destroy and which were not 
destroyed by the concentration camp survivors, who sometimes started bonfires as a 
means of celebrating their liberation. 
Gaining access to eyewitnesses also requires East-West cooperation in some cases. 
Many people who were either victims of Nazi persecution or who actually perpetrated 
crimes remained behind the Iron Curtain after the war ended. In the case of the 
survivors, most simply ended up living there. In the case of the perpetrators, many of 
them were apprehended by the Soviet government, the Polish government, and the 
Czech government, and served sentences in those countries. Some of them are still 
serving sentences. Others of them have since been released. In sum, both documentary 
and testimonial evidence of great value is located to this day behind the Iron Curtain. 
When OSI's predecessor, the Special Litigation Unit of the U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service was established in the late 1970s, one problem it faced was getting 
cooperation from the Soviets. The Soviet Union had been cooperating for many years 
with the West German government, but never with the United States. The Soviets had, 
in a few cases in the early 60's, identified people they said were Nazi war criminals living 
in various cities and towns in the United States. They had even requested the extradition 
of these people. Those requests were consistently turned down - turned down not only 
on the proper legal basis (namely, that we did not have, as we still do not have, an 
extradition treaty with the Soviet Union), but also were communicated to the Soviets in 
a more or less cavalier and insulting way by the State Department. I believe it was in 
1978 that the first Director of the Special Litigation Unit, Martin Mendelsohn, went to 
the Soviet Union and had preliminary discussions with officials there. During those 
discussions, Moscow indicated in principle its willingness to cooperate. One must remem-
ber that some twenty million Soviet citizens were murdered by the Nazis during the 
Second World War. 
One must also understand that the Soviets have gone to lengths that I believe even 
the United States would not go to permit the testing of their evidence. Surely, in the 
case of documents, I know the United States would not allow the kind of testing that 
the Soviets have permitted. The Soviets have allowed original documents from their 
archives not only to be removed from the Soviet Union and transported to the United 
States for use in American courtrooms, but they have also permitted what is called 
"destructive testing." I am anticipating a little bit here, but, as I will discuss later, one of 
the principal - perhaps the principal defense in any case in which a document from 
behind the Iron Curtain is off~red in evidence - is that it is forged or fabricated. As a 
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result, the Justice Department finds it extremely helpful if foreign governments allow 
prosecution and defense experts to test chemically and physically that evidence. In the 
case of documents, destructive testing involves actually removing plugs of paper and ink 
samples from the documents themselves. I know the people who run the Modern Military 
Branch at the U.S. National Archives. If you were to ask, "Can we remove a little plug 
of paper from one of your documents?" not only would they show you the way to the 
outside of the Archives, but you would undoubtedly go via the window. There is just no 
chance that the National Archives would allow that kind of testing, but the Soviets have 
permitted it, time and again. 
Cooperation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in Nazi cases generally follows a standard 
format. Typically, OSI will have someone under investigation. An investigation can begin 
in any number of ways. If the crimes were committed in the Soviet Union, or in any of 
the Baltic states that are now occupied by the Soviet Union, OSI's request for assistance 
will be transmitted from the Justice Department via the State Department to the Soviets. 
OSI will request copies of any documents they have and any witnesses who may live in 
the U.S.S.R. If it turns out that the Soviets have located witnesses, depositions will 
thereafter be scheduled, and American prosecutors from OSI will travel there along 
with defense counsel, at government expense, to cross-examine those witnesses. 
As you might expect, defense counsel generally fight tooth and nail to secure a 
protective order against the taking of these depositions. The Justice Department's po-
sition has consistently been that it will pursue the evidentiary trail wherever it leads, and 
that just because a trail goes behind the Iron Curtain is no reason to stop following it. 
If you do not go, for example, to Poland, you are saying tha! much of the key docu-
mentation concerning the Nazi death camps, documentation that has been used in war 
crimes trials in a number of Western countries, cannot be used here in our own country. 
You are saying to people who survived the Holocaust, who find themselves now in, for 
example, the Soviet Union, that their testimony, what they have to say about their own 
victimization and the victimization of their families and their people, will not be heard, 
that it will not be credited. The Justice Department, under a succession of Attorneys 
General has rejected that idea. More importantly, the federal courts have rejected it as 
well. 
What are the objections that have been raised? They are essentially of two types: 
one to the depositions and the other to the documents. In the case of depositions, the 
principal objection has been that Soviet procurators, and particularly those who remain 
in the room while the examination and cross-examination of the witness is being con-
ducted, occasionally restrict questioning by defense counsel. Let us look at what really 
happens in those confrontations. The fact is, Soviets' have allowed full cross-examination 
by defense counsel as permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and full 
American-style cross-examination. Although U.S. rules are very intricate, and frankly 
quite alien to the Soviets, they nonetheless do endeavor to conform to these rules. To 
the extent that questioning has been curtailed by Soviet procurators, it has generally 
been as a result of a clever tactic that is employed by defense counsel in these cases. 
More often than not, defense lawyers who go to the Soviet Union to cross-examine 
witnesses attempt to craft questions that they know will prove objectionable to the Soviet 
authorities. These are demonstrably irrelevant questions, typically going to matters of 
Soviet security. For example, a common tactic will be to begin asking the witness about 
police procedures and KGB personnel and police personnel in the Soviet Union -
matters that are completely irrelevant to the adjudication of the case at hand. Typically, 
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the procurators will let that go on for a little while, and then they will say, "Now wait a 
minute, what on earth does this have to do with this action?" Defense counsel will then, 
for the benefit of the video cameras that are brought by the government to record these 
depositions so that they can be viewed by judges, create a big commotion with a series 
of angry objections. When they return to the U.S., counsel complains loudly to the court 
that cross-examination was "improperly restricted." I suppose defense lawyers have a 
certain poetic license to do that kind of thing. But one must appreciate the gambit for 
what it is: a clever tactic that has more to do with theatre than with law. 
Objections have also been raised to documentary evidence that comes from archives 
in the Soviet Union and elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain. As I have mentioned before, 
both the Soviets and the Poles allow destructive testing of their documents. These 
documents are tested by the American government - by the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, and also by experts hired by defense counsel. Not once in the 
more than forty years that documentary evidence from behind the Iron Curtain has 
been used in war crimes trials - in Nuremberg, and later in West Germany, Canada, 
Holland and the United States - has anyone demonstrated that in even one case, that 
even one document has been improperly altered, tampered with, or fabricated. These 
documents are tested not only scientifically, but also in terms of their content. They have 
been found to be consistent with records housed in archives in the United States, many 
of which were previously classified. Hence, the Soviets would have had no access to those 
records. As a result, they would have had no ability to "create" documents that are 
consistent with those in U.S. hands. 
Regarding the witnesses, the same experience has been had. That is, in the forty 
years since Western courts first began using the testimony of witnesses from behind the 
Iron Curtain, no one has been able to demonstrate that in even one case a witness 
offered perjured testimony. Do the witnesses always give correct testimony? No, they do 
not. In no country in the world do witnesses always give absolutely correct testimony. 
What you find in the Soviet Union, as in the United States, Canada, and every other 
country in the world, is that witness testimony is by and large consistent. There are those 
little inconsistencies that one always has when several witnesses are testifying. '{hose 
inconsistencies in themselves are powerful indicia of the reliability of the testimony, 
particularly, of course, when you are talking about events that took place forty years 
ago. 
When one considers the question of the reliability of Soviet source witness testimony, 
it is important to remember that every single one of these witnesses is an elderly person. 
Any attorney who has had experience with elderly witnesses will tell you that it is almost 
impossible even to imagine getting such people to act out a phony story. No amount of 
"coaching" would work. These people simply could not pull it off. 
As I mentioned before, all of these overseas depositions are recorded on videotape. 
Courts in the United States thus have the opportunity to review the tapes and judge the 
credibility of the witness for themselves. Further on the subject of Soviet-source testi-
monial evidence, I would note that time and again witnesses behind the Iron Curtain 
offer exculpatory testimony about suspects and defendants in the United States. I do 
not know that anyone at the Justice Department has ever said this before, but I will tell 
you that in the overwhelming majority of cases in which OSI asks the Soviet government, 
"Do you have anything on person X?" they come back and tell us either, (a) they have 
nothing at all, or (b) they have "the enclosed items." What are the "enclosed items?" 
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They are, as often as not, documents and witness statements fully exculpating OSl's 
suspect - such as testimony of people who knew him during the war who say, "No, he 
wasn't involved in anything. He was a clerk. He was a low-level person of a unit, didn't 
do anything," or, "He wasn't in such a unit at all." So the idea that the Soviets are out 
to nail all these people simply flies in the face of reality. 
I would finally say that those activists who question the validity of Soviet-origin 
evidence do not want you to know that in case after case, suspects and defendants under 
investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice admit the essential facts contained in the 
Soviet-source documents and in the Soviet-source testimony. The suspects rarely make 
such admissions when the case is first filed, but by the time these cases get to court, most 
of the defendants are admitting the essential facts. The example that comes to mind 
most readily and most powerfully is that of George Theodorovich, formerly Yuri Theo-
dorovich. When we found him some years back, he was living outside of Albany, New 
York. During the war, he had served in a Ukrainian Auxiliary Police battalion in the city 
of Lvov. The Soviet authorities found several documents seemingly signed by Yuri 
Theodorovich, reports on events in August of 1942, when most of the Jews were rounded 
up and sent to camps and many others were killed. These reports, except for their 
sinister significance, were not at all unlike reports that any police officer in the United 
States would have to file any time he or she fired a weapon for any reason. In these 
reports, Theodorovich wrote such things as, "On this day, I, Yuri Theodorovich, a police 
candidate, fired six bullets with which I killed two Jews." Then he went on to describe 
matter-of-factly, how the bodies were left in the Jewish cemetery and how another police 
officer also witnessed what he called "the event." When I first questioned Yuri Theo-
dorovich in the U.S. Attorney's Office in Albany, as soon as we got to the matter of his 
joining the Ukrainian police, he said, "Who me?" When I asked him again he said, "No, 
no, not true." Then he turned to my court stenographer and said "KGB do a good job." 
She looked confused and he said, "Did you hear that? KGB do a good job. Get that 
down." He then asked if I might terminate the interview so that he could retain an 
attorney, and I said, "Of course." Some months later at his attorney's office in Philadel-
phia, with his attorney at his side, he not only admitted being in the Ukrainian Police, 
he also admitted authoring those damning reports. This was arguably the strongest 
evidence of murder obtained by federal authorities since Jack Ruby shot Lee Harvey 
Oswald on national television in 1963. Time and again, then, defendants themselves 
authenticate the testimony and documents from behind the Iron Curtain. Theodorovich 
is but one example. 
This entire campaign, and that is what it is, against the use of evidence found behind 
the Iron Curtain, must be placed in context. The context that I would suggest is that it 
is all part of a larger campaign primarily based in the Baltic and Ukrainian communities, 
which has as its goal the disabling, or better yet, the closing down of the Office of Special 
Investigations. If you speak with these people, if you read their very slick literature, they 
will assure you that they fully support efforts to bring what they call "genuine" Nazi war 
criminals to justice, and that they only take issue with the "methods" employed by the 
Justice Department. In private, however, a different message is given. For example, in 
private meetings held at the State Department, at the White House, with the National 
Security Council and at the Justice Department, leading anti-OSI activists have quite 
candidly called for the imposition of the administrative equivalent of a statute of limi-
tations so that these prosecutions would end in the near future. One such proposal was 
made on behalf of these groups by a man who is now a partner at one of the most 
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prestigious law firms in the country, Kirkland & Ellis in Chicago, Illinois. This attorney 
is a frequent speaker. He will fly allover the country to lambast and condemn as!. 
When he was recently contacted by a journalist who knew something about his White 
House meeting, he said, "I do not want to be quoted on anything having to do with the 
statute of limitations, please." 
Mr. Ryan: That's because we beat him in court. 
Mr. Rosenbaum: True. The most lamentable part of this campaign is that it has a significant 
anti-Semitic component. That is an especial danger for the children who have access in 
these communities to this material. The groups who publish this literature were hoping, 
I dare say, that supporters of the Justice Department's Nazi prosecution program would 
never get our hands on this literature. Typically, it's written in Lithuanian and Ukrainian, 
and thus few Americans see it. Permit me to read just one example. 
This is from the Lithuanian weekly newspaper Darbininkas, published in Brooklyn, 
New York. I read now from a study that I helped put together for the Anti-Defamation 
League. Darbininkas is the largest circulating Lithuanian newspaper in the state of New 
York. When OSI was first beginning in the late 70's, the newspaper was already opposed 
to it. Here is the kind of thing that they wrote: "The Jews murdered not sixty but seventy, 
seventy million innocent people, perhaps more, because the murder of people in the 
Soviet Union has not stopped even now. Since 1917, the Jews were the rulers of Russia 
and its enslaved people and the murderers of innocent people." Then, in one of the 
most obscene sentences I have ever seen, they wrote that the Jews only got what they 
deserved after all. "Amazing!", they write, "Amazing that the Jews do not answer the 
question why Hitler started on the destruction of Jews." 
One must understand that these groups have ready access to the Reagan adminis-
tration. They are a powerful Republican voting block. And although I must say in 
fairness that the Reagan administration has been fully supportive of as I, the fact remains 
that the administration is subjected, as is Congress, to heavy lobbying efforts on a weekly 
and monthly basis by these groups. They have a powerful ally in the person of White 
House Communications Director Patrick Buchanan, who the New York Times called the 
third most powerful person in the administration. On local Washington television some 
five years ago Buchanan confronted Allan Ryan and said, "You know it's really a waste 
of money at this late date to be spending federal tax dollars on the pursuit of Nazi war 
criminals. Why don't we spend that tracking down organized crime kingpins?" 
OSI's opponents have created some very slick promotional literature and even some 
professionally crafted motion pictures to advance their views. They screened one of their 
anti-OS I films for members of Congress at the Washington Sheraton Hotel just a few 
weeks ago, as part of a wine and cheese reception. An important recent development is 
the creation of well funded-front groups to do battle with as!. Many of these organi-
zations have adopted names that incorporate objectives that we all would agree are lofty. 
Who would imagine what the real agenda is of such groups as "Americans for Due 
Process" or the "Coalition for Constitutional Justice and Security"? Americans for Due 
Process recently published a book called Soviet Evidence in North American Courts. It is 200 
pages of misinformation, distortion, and convenient omission. Its purpose is to incor-
porate all kinds of erroneous hearsay so that it can then be cited in legal briefs. There 
are enough law students, law professors, and lawyers in this room to tell you that once 
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it's in a book you can easily cite it in a brief and it matters not that it is hearsay. That 
was a very clever move. 
Finally, let me report the sad news that these groups have not been entirely inef-
fective. Their efforts have helped convince three courts to throw out Soviet witness 
testimony and to allow Nazi persecutors to go free even though defense counsel was 
unable to prove that any of these witnesses had testified falsely. The most dramatic case 
is that of Edgars Laipenieks. Bruce Einhorn did a yeoman's job in that case, convincing 
the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals that the respondent should be deported. Lai-
penieks had admitted in court that he beat people with his fists while he was serving as 
an officer in the Nazi-sponsored Latvian Security Police. He used to beat people to get 
what he called "the truth" out of them. But on appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals decided that this was a plan who should be allowed to continue living here, and 
it threw out all of the Soviet deposition testimony concerning his participation in acts of 
murder. 
Another example is the case of Juozas Kungys, whom the U.S. District Court in 
Newark, New Jersey found was lying about where he was during the war. He tried to 
convince the court that he wasn't in the town in Lithuania where the murders he was 
accused of committing took place. His deception was conclusively proven when OSI 
offered in evidence a letter that he had written to a friend of his after the lawsuit began 
- a letter in which he said, "Look I was there, but I do not want anyone to know about 
it." The court found that the defendant had lied his way into the United States. But 
then it threw out the Soviet witness testimony, although the Court conceded that there 
was no proof that any of it was perjured. Without that testimony, the government had 
no proof of murder, and it lost the case. Thus, Kungys was permitted by the court to 
retain his U.S. citizenship, his lies in procuring that citizenship notwithstanding. 
I see that I am out of time. Thank you. 
Ms. Teitel: Thank you, Eli. Some of the issues that Eli touched upon were the free speech 
issues that will be discussed later. I just want to make a couple of observations on all 
three presentations before we turn to questions. The pressures against OSI that Eli noted 
are real. I just wanted to take this moment with the reunion that we have here on the 
panel of past and present activist lawyers working within OSI to congratulate OSI for 
its record. Today is the third day of the Demjanjuk trial. We were anticipating the 
beginning of the Demjanjuk trial in Israel and thanks to OSI, justice will finally be 
achieved. 
Another note, Allan Ryan had pointed out that every year counts. There is now a 
bill in the House, sponsored by U.S. Rep. Barney Frank, that would establish an inde-
pendent commission to investigate federal involvement with the immigration of Nazi 
collaborators. 
I'd just like to move on and make some comments on the panels. Bruce Einhorn 
mentioned some of the proof problems. You have a very high standard here of clear 
and convincing "evidence. There was reference made to collateral estoppel, which is an 
effort to eliminate the duplication between the denaturalization proceedings and depor-
tation proceedings, in order to in some way limit the great number of years that go by 
with these cases. Let me ask the panel a couple of questions. First, procedurally would 
there be any changes in the law that you could think of that would facilitate the depor-
tation process? And two, with what we have seen, which is justice achieved through 
extradition, in the last year, could we have any use of the universality principle and 
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criminal prosecutions in the United States? We've seen that Israel, a country that was 
founded after the crimes that Demjanjuk was responsible for, the country of the victims, 
is responsible for bringing him to justice. Many have asked me "What kind of jurisdiction 
does this law have?" Well, the jurisdiction is the jurisdiction that Bruce mentioned, the 
universality principle. It applies when someone has committed a crime against humanity. 
He is an enemy of all people. So if Israel could bring Demjanjuk to trial, so could we in 
the United States. It seems a pity after all the work that has been done in the United 
States that we have stopped short of punishment. We are satisfied with deportation. So 
I throw those two questions out: whether there are any procedural changes you could 
recommend, and whether there could be an extension of the universality principle. 
Panel: The Courts have recognized the existence of the universality principle in the 
substantive law of the United States via the Law of Nations. The problem seems to be 
that you need a jurisdictional predicate for trying the individual on what are already 
recognized to be substantive offenses. In Filartiga there was a civil statute passed by 
Congress to provide a way of suing state-sponsored torturers. In the Demjanjuk case, an 
international agreement surrendered him to Israel for punishment. It appears that what 
is required is a jurisdictional predicate. I am a public prosecutor. I am not in private 
practice. I am not going to express my own personal opinion on whether such predicates 
should be passed by Congress and the President, nor what form they should take. It 
appears from the legal work that has been done in this area and from the cases and the 
history of war crimes work, that what is needed is some sort of legislative or executive 
action that would create a jurisdictional predicate. Whether that is advisable and what 
form it should take is for elected representatives and voters. 
Ms. Teitel: Any other comments? 
Mr. Weinschenk: Two very brief comments. Twenty years ago, I was called upon by the 
Immigration Service to obtain evidence from Germany for them. I can only express the 
highest respect for OSI for the work they have done since then. As an outsider, I have 
to assure this audience that OSI has done tremendously well with a limited staff. 
The second comment is that you can see from the depressing results in Germany 
how hard this work is. The burden on the American prosecutor is merely to show that 
these criminals falsify their applications. The German prosecutor has the burden of 
proof to show substantive law - substantive criminal culpability. 
Mr. Ryan: I think I'd have to differ with you on the question of the burden of proof for 
the U.S. government. We have to show both things. We have to show that he falsified 
his application. But, how do we show that? If we say someone falsified his application 
when he checked the box that said he was not a Nazi war criminal, the only way we can 
show that is to prove that he was a Nazi war criminal. What we had to do was go into 
court and say, "This man is a Nazi war criminal, and this is what he did from 1933 to 
1945." So we, as a practical matter, have that burden of proof, even though the ultimate 
verdict, if you will, is illegal entry into this country. We have to take on that substantive 
burden as well. 
